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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida, like all states,' regulates the practice of medicine by statute.
Florida Statutes chapter 458 (1971), the Medical Practice Act, is a com-
prehensive regulatory scheme which defines the practice of medicine,
sets qualifications for such practice, establishes a state board of medical
examiners, and sets penalties for unauthorized practice. Florida Statutes
section 458.13(1) (1971) defines the practice of medicine as diagnosis,
treatment or prescription "for any human disease, pain, injury, deformity
or physical or mental condition." Over fifty years have passed since this
definition was written. Vast changes have since taken place in medical
science.' Is the statutory definition still sound in light of these changes?
Do the constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal
protection require that it be revised to provide for recognition of new
forms of practice? Answers to these questions are needed if the de-
velopment of new forms of practice is not to be delayed in a maze of con-
flicting legal principles.
Existing case law generally supports the power of the state to
require practitioners of unscientific medical cults to obtain the same
qualifications required of trained medical doctors. However, this au-
thority should not be extended so as to validate statutory requirements
that practitioners of legitimate healing arts master skills unrelated to
their form of treatment. A distinction must be drawn between limited
practice and quackery. To the extent that they do not make the distinc-
tion, present medical practice acts are subject to constitutional attack
on two grounds. First, scientific forms of limited medical practice are
entitled to legislative recognition. Statutes which require knowledge of
* Member of the Editorial Board, University of Miami Law Review.
1. A compilation of state codes regulating medical practice may be found in Forgot-
son, Roemer & Newman, Licensure of Physicians, 1967 WASH. U.L.Q. 249, 250-51 [herein-
after cited as Licensure of Physicians].
2. id. at 249.
COMMENTS
unrelated skills are unreasonable. Second, statutory schemes which
license unscientific practitioners (e.g. chiropractors and naturopaths),
but deny authorization to qualified limited practitioners, may be guilty of
arbitrary and irrational classification. This article examines the judicial
development of these two arguments.
Medical licensure laws were first enacted in the United States dur-
ing the late 19th and early 20th centuries.' Their announced purpose
was to protect the public against quacks and incompetents, and to foster
the growth of scientific practices." To that end, the state legislatures
typically defined the practice of medicine in sweeping terms, so as to
include within the regulatory provisions practitioners of every degree of
form and competence. This legislative purpose was given effect by the
courts, which have held every form of diagnosis or treatment to be the
practice of medicine. The following have been found to be within the
statutory definition: naturopaths, 5 chiropractors," osteopaths,7 physical
therapists,' hypno-therapists, 9 hearing and speech therapists, 10 and mani-
curists and pedicurists who perform more than cosmetic functions."'
The definition has also been found to include the proprietor of a health-
food store who advised customers what to eat when they came to him
with complaints of minor ailments.12 Advising someone to exercise, stay
out of drafts, and see a doctor does not constitute the practice of medi-
cine,13 nor does non-therapeutic massage.' 4 Giving blood pressure tests
and announcing the results, without giving advice or prescribing treat-
ment, is not included.' 5 The dividing line is "diagnosis" or "treatment."
These terms will be broadly interpreted by the courts: "The practice of
medicine is defined broadly enough to apply to witch doctors, voodoo
queens, or the pharmacist who suggests aspirin for a headache."' Where
the statute fails to define "the practice of medicine," the courts have sup-
plied a broad definition, and have rejected the contention that the failure
to provide a statutory definition rendered the act void for vagueness.' 7
3. Id.
4. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195 (1898).
5. Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 919
(1957); Aitchison v. State, 204 Md. 538, 105 A.2d 495, cert. denied, 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
6. Commonwealth v. Zimmerman, 221 Mass. 184, 108 N.E. 893 (1915).
7. Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S. 288 (1912).
8. 1955-1956 FLA. ATT'y GEN. BENmnAL REP. 463.
9. Id. at 467.
10. 1963-1964 FLA. ATT'Y GEm. Bcn Nl=x, REP. 415.
11. 1965-1966 FLA. AT'Y Gax. BiENNrAL REP. 120.
12. Pinkus v. MacMahon, 129 N.J.L. 367, 29 A.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
13. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Craft, 93 So.2d 298 (La. App. 1957).
14. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Martindale, 83 So.2d 544 (La. App.
1955).
15. Lambert v. State, 77 So.2d 869 (Fla. 1955).
16. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 259 F.2d 626, 633 (5th
Cir. 1958) (dissenting opinion).
17. State v. Errington, 355 S.W.2d 952 (Mo. 1962); cf. State v. Ramos, 232 So.2d 381
(Fla. 1970), holding that the term "profess to be a podiatrist" is not vague.
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In order to provide for licensure of dentists, nurses, and other
health personnel, all the states 8 have provided statutory exceptions to
the general definition of the practice of medicine. Florida exempts duly
licensed podiatrists, optometrists, osteopaths, psychologists, nurses,
pharmacists, dentists and midwives, to the extent that they limit their
practices to the powers granted by their respective statutes.'" Also
exempted are religious healers, 20 family 2' and emergency care, 22 and
the fitting of eyeglasses and certain medical appliances.23 Chiropractors
and naturopaths have persuaded the legislature to accord them a limited
recognition.24 However, there is no provision in this patchwork of ex-
emptions for the recognition of new limited forms of practice as they
are developed. This creates a dilemma: In the absence of a specific
exemption, no new form of limited practice may develop; but, until it
develops, its practitioners will not have sufficient lobbying strength and
public acceptance to obtain a legislative exemption. Therefore, limited
practitioners will develop, if at all, in violation of the medical practice
acts.
II. NEW AREAS OF "MEDICAL PRACTICE"
The broad statutory definitions of the practice of medicine may
encompass such diverse disciplines as yoga, Transcendental Meditation,
acupuncture, and human nutrition, to the extent that they involve the
diagnosis or treatment of a "physical or mental condition. ' 25 Although
yoga 26 and Transcendental Meditation" rest on medically-sound prin-
ciples, they are popularly associated with the Eastern mysticism which
produced them.28 They are beyond the scope of this comment because
their mythology may place them within the purview of the religious
healing exception 29 and because they present unique licensing problems.80
18. A compilation of the statutory exceptions may be found in Licensure of Physicians,
supra note 1, at 251-52.
19. FLA. STAT. § 458.13(2)(a) (1971).
20. FLA. STAT. § 458.13(2)(f) (1971).
21. FLA. STAT. § 458.13(2)(e) (1971).
22. FLA. STAT. § 458.13(2)(d) (1971).
23. FLA. STAT. § 458.13(2)(g) (1971).
24. FLA. STAT. § 458.13(2)(a) (1971).
25. FLA. STAT. § 458.13(1) (1971).
26. Yoga is used as therapy for a broad range of medical problems, from psychiatric
disorders to back troubles. Davidson, The Rush for Instant Salvation, 243 HARPER'S 40
(July 1971) [hereinafter cited as Davidson].
27. Scientific experiments strongly indicate that Transcendental Meditation induces
physiological changes. It may be an effective treatment for alcoholism and drug addiction.
Tim , Oct. 25, 1971, at 51. See also Williams, Transcendental Meditation: Can it Fight
Drug Abuse? 71 SCi. DIGEST 74 (Feb. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Williams].
28. This is a misconception. Transcendental Meditation and yoga are no longer the
exclusive province of mystics and religious cultists. Williams, supra note 27. Stripped of
their traditional but non-essential mythology, both techniques may become effective forms
of medical therapy in the hands of trained lay practitioners.
29. FLA. STAT. § 458.13(2)(f) (1971).
30. "Anyone may call himself a swami, a guru, or a reverend, place an ad in the
local underground and wait for the phone to ring." Davidson, supra note 26 at 40.
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Acupuncture is an ancient Chinese method of drugless anesthesia
which has only recently attracted American interest. Chinese acupunc-
turists insert needles in body nerve centers, producing a safe and highly
effective anesthesia."' China does not require its practitioners to be
graduates of medical schools.32 Indeed, one of the major advantages of
the method is that it does not require training in sophisticated medical
technology. 33 Acupuncture is expected to become popular in this country,
and the qualifications of its new practitioners will largely depend on statu-
tory regulation.8 4
Nutrition is a science which has assumed major medical impor-
tance since the original medical practice laws were enacted.88 Florida
law makes no provision for prescription of diets by nutritionists, de-
spite the fact that, "many diseases and conditions of unknown etiology
have now been revealed to be essentially nutritional disorders which
in most cases can be dramatically corrected by nutritional therapy." 6
Additionally, there are many new forms of paramedical technology
which are threatened by outmoded definitions of the practice of medi-
cine.8 7
These examples of developing medical disciplines illustrate the
range of potential problems under present licensing provisions:
In spite of these developments, laws regulating the practice
of medicine primarily recognize only the physician with twelve
to fourteen years of education and training after high school
and the professional nurse who may have had as little as two
years of formal education after high school.88
The following sections examine the constitutional validity of the
medical practice acts as applied to new forms of limited practice.
III. THE REGULATORY POWER
The states' power to regulate the medical profession has been con-
sistently upheld by the United States Supreme Court since 1889. In
Dent v. West Virginia,9 defendant had been convicted for unlawfully
practicing medicine without a license. He attacked his conviction on
the ground that the license requirement deprived him of the right to
31. Churchill, Chinese Focus on Internal Rejorms, Deny Aspirations for Expansion-
irm, The Miami Herald, May 8, 1972, at 32-A, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Churchill].
32. Simpson, Acupuncture, 55 SAT. REV. 47 (Feb. 19, 1972) [hereinafter cited as
Simpson].
33. Churchill, supra note 31.
34. Simpson, supra note 32.
35. Pothier, Fillios & Stare, Nutrition, in 9 CYCLOPEDIA OF MEDICINE 760A (1970).
36. Id.
37. Forgotson & Cook, Innovations and Experiments in Uses of Health Manpower-
The Effect of Licensure Laws, in MEDICAL PROGRESS AND THE LAW 171 (1969).
38. Id. at 174.
39. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
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practice his profession. The court found that the defendant had an
"undoubted" right to follow any lawful profession, free of arbitrary
governmental regulation.4 ° However, it also recognized the state's power
to provide for the general welfare through the prescription of regula-
tions designed to secure the public from its own "ignorance and in-
capacity" in medical matters. 1 Because few laymen possessed sufficient
knowledge of "those subtle and mysterious influences upon which health
and life depend," few were capable of judging a physician's qualifica-
tions. 2 "Reliance must be placed upon the assurance given by his
license."4 Therefore:
The power of the State to provide for the general welfare of
its people authorizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in
its judgment, will secure or tend to secure them against the
consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of decep-
tion and fraud.4
Dent's conviction was consequently upheld as a valid exercise of the
state's power to provide for the general welfare.
In 1898, the Court reaffirmed the legislature's power to prescribe
qualifications necessary "to prevent the imposition of quacks, adven-
turers, and charlatans upon the ignorant and credulous ... ," and to
"secure them the services of reputable, skilled and learned men."45
Thirty years later, the Court upheld a Minnesota statute which granted
dental licenses only to graduates of accredited dental colleges. 6 This
condition was validated on the basis that ."police statutes may only
be declared unconstitutional where they are arbitrary or unreason-
able .... ,47
During its October, 1934, term, the same court which emasculated
New Deal codes of competition in A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States,48 upheld an Oregon act which prohibited dental adver-
tising in Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners.49 Justice
Hughes, writing for a unanimous bench, took pains to distinguish den-
tists and physicians from poultry sellers:
The legislature was not dealing with traders in commodities,
but with the vital interest of public health, and with a pro-
fession treating bodily ills and demanding different standards
40. Id. at 121.
41. Id. at 122.
42. ld.
43. Id. at 122-23.
44. Id. at 122.
45. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195 (1898).
46. Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425 (1926).
47. Id. at 428.
48. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
49. 294 U.S. 608 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Semler].
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of conduct from those which are traditional in the competition
of the market place."0
Since Semler, the existence of broad power to regulate the practice of
medicine has not been seriously questioned. However, the question of
how this power may be exercised has been frequently litigated.
Challenges to the medical practice acts have typically adopted two
theories: (1) according a preference to one school of practitioners over
another constitutes a denial of equal protection; (2) the licensing re-
quirements as applied to purported "limited practitioners" are unrea-
sonable.
IV. EQUAL PROTECTION
The equal protection argument was first considered by the Supreme
Court in Watson v. Maryland.5 Watson was convicted of practicing
medicine without a license. He alleged that the statute denied him the
equal protection of the laws, inter alia, because it exempted from its
provisions chiropodists, midwives and masseurs, who confined them-
selves to manual manipulation. The Court applied a now-familiar test:
if the classification "has a reasonable basis and is not merely arbitrary
selection without real difference" between those included and those ex-
cluded, it will be sustained.52 Because the classification in question was
found to be "not without reason," it was upheld.
Unreasonable classification was alleged, without success, in Semler.
Justice Hughes cited Watson as authority for the proposition that a
statute may properly limit one profession (here dentistry) without burden-
ing all others to the same extent.
The state was not bound to deal alike with all these classes,
or to strike at all evils at the same time or in the same way.
It could deal with the different professions according to the
needs of the public in relation to each.53
Watson's distinction between physical manipulators and doctors,
and Semler's distinction between physicians and dentists, are easily
accepted. A statute which exempts back and foot manipulators from the
extensive educational requirements demanded of physicians (Watson)
rests on real and obvious differences between the two professions. The
practice of dentistry is easily distinguished by any layman from the
practice of medicine (Semler). However, the distinction is not so clear
when the legislature picks and chooses among practitioners of various
medical cults, according recognition to some while refusing to license
others.
50. Id. at 612.
51. 218 U.S. 173 (1910) [hereinafter cited as Watson].
52. Id. at 178.
53. Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935).
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An early Supreme Court decision, Crane v. Johnson,54 upheld
California's distinction between drugless practitioners and prayer-healers.
The state statute required drugless practitioners to complete a course of
study and pass an examination, but specifically exempted "treatment
by prayer."55 Crane, a drugless practitioner who allegedly effected cures
through the use of faith, hope, and mental suggestion, claimed that the
legislature had no rational basis for distinguishing between his practice
and healing by prayer alone. Substantial similarities were obvious. How-
ever, Crane claimed diagnostic skills, "and special knowledge is there-
fore required."5 The legislature's determination that diagnosis required
special training but that prayer did not was sustained as a reasonable
basis for exempting prayer-only healers.57
Naturopaths, osteopaths and chiropractors are responsible for most
of the case law dealing with the equal protection argument. Naturop-
athy is a drugless system of therapy using physical and natural remedies
such as air, light, water, heat, massage, and plant substances.5 8 Osteop-
athy and chiropractic share similar origins, although osteopaths sub-
sequently abandoned their original tenets59 and, unlike chiropractors,"0
are now generally accepted as scientific practitioners by the medical
profession.6 In its original form, osteopathy was a drugless method of
therapy based on the theory that disease was caused by "deranged
mechanisms" of the bones and nerves.62 Osteopaths "remedied" such
conditions by manipulation of the bones and muscles.68 Chiropractic
doctrine holds that diseases are caused by a "subluxation" (misalign-
ment) of the spinal vertabrae, which can be cured by manipulation of
the spine. 4
Equal protection arguments have been raised by naturopaths com-
plaining of statutory discrimination in favor of osteopaths and chiro-
practors, and by chiropractors complaining of favoritism toward osteo-
54. 242 U.S. 339 (1917) [hereinafter cited as Crane].
59. Id. at 342.
56. Id. at 344.
57. Id.
58. Perry v. Larson, 25 F. Supp. 728, 729 (S.D. Fla. 1938). FLA. STAT. § 462.01 (1971)
defines naturopathy in greater detail. Naturopathy is vanishing by attrition. Licensure of
Physicians, supra note 1, at 298. In Florida, only those naturopaths who were practicing
in 1959 may renew their licenses. FLA. STAT. § 462.022 (1971).
59. Licensure of Physicians, supra note 1, at 290-91.
60. Id. at 299; England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 126 So.2d 51,
56 (La. App. 1960) (testimony of physicians that it is "silly" to allude to chiropractic as
a science).
61. Licensure of Physicians, supra note 1, at 291.
62. Id. at 290-91. FLA. STAT. §§ 459.01, 459.08 (1971) contain a modern definition of
osteopathy.
63. Parks v. State, 159 Ind. 211, 229, 64 N.E. 862, 869 (1902).
64. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 246 F. Supp. 993, 995 (E.D.
La. 1965) (three-judge court) [hereinafter cited as England]. FLA. STAT. § 460.11 (1971)
defines chiropractic in greater detail.
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paths. Typical are Aitchison v. State65 and Louisiana State Board of
Medical Examiners v. Fife.66 In Aitchison, a naturopath was convicted
of practicing medicine without a license. The statute excluded, among
others, osteopaths and chiropractors, who were separately licensed.
The Maryland court rejected the defendant's contention that denial of
like exemption to naturopaths was a violation of equal protection. Crane
was cited as authority for the proposition that medical regulations
"need not be uniform with respect to all methods and systems of prac-
tice."67 Fife involved a challenge to Louisiana's exemption of osteo-
paths from its medical practice act. Defendants alleged that the act
denied them the equal protection of the laws by requiring them to take
a full medical and surgical course, while allowing osteopaths to practice
without such knowledge. The court held this distinction to be within the
"reasonable discretion" of the legislature.68 Neither the Aitchison nor
Fife court alluded to the existence of distinguishing characteristics be-
tween the privileged and non-privileged cults. Unlike the physician-
chiropodist distinction in Watson and the physician-dentist distinction
in Semler, the chief differences between the cults may well have been
in their names and the strength of their lobbies.69 The refusal to look for
essential differences is puzzling, in light of Crane's careful attention to
that issue.
Aitchison and Fife provided the basis of Hitchcock v. Collenberg,7 °
which rejected a naturopath's equal protection attack on the Maryland
medical practice act. Like the statutes in the two earlier cases, Mary-
land's act provided special exemptions for some cults, including osteop-
athy and chiropractic, while requiring practitioners of other cults to
qualify as medical doctors. The court justified this inequality in a curious
fashion. It reasoned that under the statutory exemption, the treatment
which osteopaths and chiropractors could give was limited, while naturo-
paths "undertake to treat any and all diseases in a wide variety of
fashions."'" However, chiropractic also claims to be a "complete and
independent healing art."7 Chiropractic is a limited treatment in Mary-
land only because the statute makes it so. When two cults each offer a
65. 204 Md. 538, 105 A.2d 495 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 880 (1954) [hereinafter
cited as Aitchison].
66. 162 La. 681, 111 So. 58 (1926) [hereinafter cited as Fife]. See also Commonwealth
v. Zimmerman, 221 Mass. 184, 108 N.E. 893 (1915) (chiropractor challenged exemption of
osteopaths), and cases collected in Annot., 54 A.L.R. 600 (1928); Annot., 42 A.L.R. 1342
(1926); Annot., 37 A.L.R. 680 (1925); Annot., 16 A.L.R. 709 (1922).
67. 204 Md. at 548-49, 105 A.2d at 500.
68. 162 La. at 690, 111 So. at 61.
69. The cults used similar practices in their early stages of development. See Licensure
of Physicians, supra note 1, at 290-91.
70. 140 F. Supp. 894 (D. Md. at 156), aff'd, 353 U.S. 919 (1957).
71. 140 F. Supp. at 902.
72. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 246 F. Supp. 993 (E.D.
La. 1965).
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"complete" cure, why is one entitled to limited statutory recognition
while the other is denied it? The answer can only be found in an essen-
tial difference between the cults. Unfortunately, the Hitchcock court
failed to examine the record for such differences.
The most recent Supreme Court decision involving an equal pro-
tection challenge to a medical practice act is Williamson v. Lee Optical
Co.7" An Oklahoma law prohibited advertisement of eye glasses, but
exempted sellers of ready-to-wear glasses. The effect of the law was to
discriminate against opticians and in favor of sellers of cheap, ready-
made glasses. Justice Douglas mentioned two situations in which legis-
lative discrimination within the same field will be upheld: (1) where
the evils sought to be remedied are different; and (2) where the legis-
lature, proceeding "one step at a time," tackles the phase of a problem
which it considers most acute.7 4 The equal protection clause prohibits
only "invidious discrimination. 75 Applying these tests to the Oklahoma
statute and the facts before him, Justice Douglas was able to hypothesize
that, "the ready-to-wear branch of this business may not loom large in
Oklahoma or may present problems of regulation distinct from the
other branch."7 In light of Williamson, the present federal test affords
the legislature a wide latitude in establishing classifications within a
medical practice act. The Court will search the record for possible dif-
ferences of degree between the problems of the privileged and non-
privileged classes. However, nothing in Williamson provides that
differences may be assumed without comparing the classes. Aitchison,
Fife and Hitchcock are still subject to criticism for their failure to look
for essential differences. Moreover, Williamson does not suggest that
any difference is enough to support preferential classification.
Florida continues to adhere to the rule that occupational regula-
tions "must operate with substantial fairness upon all persons simi-
larly situated." ' T In a post-Williamson case," which invalidated legisla-
tive classifications of naturopaths, the Supreme Court of Florida applied
a standard which differs substantially from the federal test.
It is well settled that a legislative classification should "have
some just relation to, or reasonable basis in, essential differ-
ences of conditions and circumstances with reference to the
subject regulated . . .. "
The difference between the federal and Florida tests is one of empha-
73. 348 U.S. 483 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Williamson].
74. Id. at 489.
75. Id.
76. Id. (Emphasis added).
77. State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 413, 167 So. 394, 399 (1936) [hereinafter
cited as Fulton].
78. Eslin v. Collins, 108 So.2d 889 (Fla. 1959).
79. Id. at 891, citing Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Abe Simon & Co., 56 Fla, 545, 552, 47
So. 1001, 1003 (1908).
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sis. However, it is clear that an equal protection challenge to occupa-
tional classifications will be more favorably received in the Florida
courts ° than in the federal system.
V. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
A. Development of the Reasonableness Test
The second argument typically raised by limited practitioners is
that the medical practice licensing requirements are unreasonable as
applied to them. The test of "reasonableness" was first stated in Dent
v. West Virgina.8 ' The Court established a test which has been re-
peated in nearly every major case:
The nature and extent of the qualifications required must de-
pend primarily upon the judgment of the state as to their
necessity. If they are appropriate to the calling or profession,
and attainable by reasonable study or application, no objec-
tion to their validity can be raised because of their stringency
or difficulty. It is only when they have no relation to such
calling or profession, or are unattainable by such reasonable
study and application, that they can operate to deprive one
of his right to pursue a lawful vocation. 2
One of the first courts to apply the test to limited practitioners
held in favor of the limited practitioner and against the North Carolina
medical practice act. 3 Biggs held himself out as a "nonmedical physi-
cian." His treatment was limited to massage and, advising patients as
to diet. The act defined the practice of medicine as the management of
"any case of disease, physical or mental, real or imaginary, with or
without drugs . . . or by any method whatsoever."8 It required all
practitioners to obtain a license and provided that license applicants
must have successfully completed a comprehensive examination. 5 The
court reviewed the broad scope of the statutory definition and asked
rhetorically, "Is it requisite that the man who treats a diseased ear shall
really be competent in obstetrics, or that it is a penalty . . . to sell a
little herb tea for the stomach ache without being scientifically versed
in pathology and physiology? The act is too sweeping.' 86 Although it
recognized the legislative power to require competent physicians, the
80. The reception was very favorable in Florida Accountants Ass'n v. Dandelake, 98
So.2d 323 (Fla. 1957) [hereinafter cited as Dandelake], which struck, as a denial of equal
protection, a distinction between certified and non-certified accountants.
81. 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
82. Id. at 122.
83. State v. Biggs, 133 N.C. 729, 46 S.E. 401 (1903) [hereinafter cited as Biggs].
84. Id. at 733, 46 S.E. at 402.
85. The subjects examined were anatomy, physiology, surgery, pathology, medical
hygiene, chemistry, pharmacy, materia medica, therapeutics, obstetrics, and the practice of
medicine.
86. 133 N.C. at 735, 46 S.E. at 403.
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court noted that, "there are methods of treatment which do not require
much skill and learning if any.18 7 Therefore, the exhaustive examination
required of Biggs by the state "is not warranted by any legitimate exer-
cise of the police power."88 The statute was further condemned as an
attempt to confer a monopoly on medical doctors. 9
Although Biggs endorsed the practice of what today would be
considered quackery, its result was not unreasonable in 1903. Univer-
sity-educated physicians were rare, and the public relied on corn doc-
tors, herb doctors and drugless healers like Andrew Biggs to attend to
their less serious ailments. A law which banished these folk healers when
no adequate substitute existed could well be considered arbitrary and
unreasonable.
In 1912 the Supreme Court, in Collins v. Texas,90 upheld the Texas
medical practice act against the challenge of an unlicensed osteopath
who attacked the required examination as unreasonable. Like the North
Carolina statute in Biggs, the Texas law conditioned licensure on knowl-
edge of subjects as diverse as bacteriology and obstetrics. Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court, laid particular stress on the defendant's
claim that he practiced a complete healing art:
He like others must begin by a diagnosis. It is no answer to
say that in many instances the diagnosis is easy-that a man
knows it when he has a cold or a toothache. For a general prac-
tice science is needed. An osteopath undertakes to be some-
thing more than a nurse or a masseur, and the difference rests
precisely in a claim to greater science, which the State requires
him to prove. 9'
Collins must be held to its facts. Had Collins limited his practice and
not laid claim to "greater science," a different result would have been
justified. Holmes wrote that "[T]he same considerations that justify
including him justify excluding the lower grades from the law.192 This
dictum affirmed the Biggs distinction between general and limited prac-
titioners.
Shortly after Collins was handed down, the highest court of Massa-
chusetts decided Commonwealth v. Zimmerman," in which the court
held that the legislative power to require skilled treatment, "may be
effectuated by requiring even of those who propose to confine their
practice to a narrow specialty a much broader knowledge of the sub-
ject. . . ."" Zimmerman implicitly rejected much of the Biggs teach-
87. Id. at 737, 46 S.E. at 404.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 736, 46 S.E. at 403.
90. 223 U.S. 288 (1912).
91. Id. at 296-97.
92. Id. at 297.
93. 221 Mass. 184, 108 N.E. 893 (1915).
94. Id. at 189, 108 N.E. at 895.
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ing, and expanded Collins by permitting the state to require of all its
practitioners, general and limited, a basic understanding of all facets of
the healing art. This requirement was justified as applied to Zimmerman,
because his chiropractic manipulation "was of a most important part of
the body and related to a nerve center."95 Unfortunately, the quoted
language applies equally to all practitioners, including those whose
effectiveness does not require the full training expected of a medical
doctor, and whose practice does not affect critical nerve centers.
The Zimmerman rule has been widely adopted. The Louisiana
court in Fife has held that there is no legislative duty to provide separate
qualifications for each school of'limited practice:
Were it otherwise, . . . [e]very group of men who might get
together and evolve some system, designed to restore health,
would be entitled to recognition, and all that could be required
of them would be evidence of good character and a knowledge
of such subjects as their particular school seemed to require,
although the Legislature might deem with reason a knowl-
edge of such subjects wholly insufficient to entitle any one to
treat the sick."
This reasoning does not support the broad holding of Fife. The legis-
lature might well find the theories of a particular cult "wholly insuffi-
cient" to treat the sick. However, if there are scientifically valid methods
which properly limit their treatment to one aspect of human health (e.g.,
nutrition), may the state deny them recognition merely because their
therapy is incomplete?
The extent to which the "reasonableness" rule has been stretched
is illustrated in Pinkus v. MacMahon.97 Defendant, who held college
degrees in the areas of food chemistry and science, biology and physiol-
ogy, operated a health-food store. Some of his customers came to him
with complaints of various aches and itches, and he advised them what
to eat. There was no allegation that he held himself out as a doctor.
However, the court sustained his conviction for unauthorized practice
because he "diagnosed" ailments. It found "nothing unreasonable in
prohibiting this practice by other than licensed physicians.""8 Pinkus
is Fife drawn to its logical extremity. The court, in effect, held that
the state may reasonably require the knowledge of surgery, obstetrics
and all the other courses required of M.D.'s and graduation from an
accredited medical school, as a condition to suggesting diets.
A more reasonable approach was taken by the Fifth Circuit in
95. Id. at 188, 108 N.E. at 894.
96. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 686, 111 So. 58,
60-61 (1926). This reasoning was adopted in the leading cases of Hitchcock v. Collenberg,
140 F. Supp. 894, 899 (D. Md. 1956), and State v. Errington, 355 S.W.2d 952, 957 (Mo.
1962).
97. 129 N.J.L. 367, 29 A.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
98. Id. at 369, 29 A.2d at 887.
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the protracted England litigation.9" Although it was reviewing the action
of a district court sitting in Louisiana, the court refused to be bound
by Fife: "In the thirty odd years since that decision was rendered, we
judicially know that the healing art in general has made further enor-
mous progress away from the ancient days when barbers did the blood
letting."'1 0 Therefore, the plaintiff-chiropractors were entitled to present
evidence to establish the unreasonableness of Louisiana's requirement
that they hold a diploma from an AMA-accredited college, and master
the art of surgery and materia medica. The argument that the state may
require all limited practitioners to meet the M.D. standard was rejected:
It is certainly true that the State is not bound to recognize
every peculiar theory or school of medicine. Without doubt it
is reasonable for the state to outlaw witch doctors, voodoo
queens, bee stingers, and various other cults which no reason-
ably intelligent man would choose for the treatment of his ills,
but it would certainly be arbitrary to exclude some, if not all,
of the following classes which Louisiana does admit to prac-
tice: dentists, osteopaths, nurses, chiropodists, optometrists,
pharmacists, and midwives.' 0 '
The court then phrased its own test for gauging the validity of licensing
requirements:
[T]he State cannot deny to any individual the right to exercise
a reasonable choice in the method of treatment of his ills, nor
the correlative right of practitioners to engage in the practice
of a useful profession.
10 2
On rehearing, the rule was further clarified to mean that "the State
cannot outlaw an allegedly useful and lawful profession without a
'reasonable' or 'rational' basis for so doing."' 1 8 This is tacit recognition
that requiring full M.D. training for a limited practice effectively pre-
vents the exercise of that practice.'
Although it provided the chiropractors an opportunity to prove the
unreasonableness of Louisiana's licensing qualifications, the court did
99. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 259 F.2d 626 (5th Cir.
1958), reh. denied, 263 F.2d 661 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1012 (1959) [hereinafter
cited as England].
100. 259 F.2d at 627.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 263 F.2d 661, 674 (5th
Cir. 1959).
104. In agreement is State ex rel. State Bd. of Medicine v. Smith, 81 Idaho 103, 110,
337 P.2d 938, 942 (1959). Earlier decisions maintained the fiction that the imposition of
such requirements did not prevent limited practice. See, e.g., Hitchcock v. Collenberg, 140
F. Supp. 894, 899 (D. Md. 1956): "The Maryland law does not prohibit the practice of
naturopathy. Any person who has met the qualifications necessary to secure a license to
practice medicine ... may apply the principles of naturopathy in his practice."
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not abandon the strict burden of proof required by the Supreme Court in
challenges to "reasonableness."
Indeed, the burden upon the plaintiffs is great, if not insur-
mountable. They must show that the Act as administered "has
no rational relation" to the regulation of chiropractic and
"therefore is beyond constitutional bounds." Williamson v.
Lee Optical Company .... 15
The Louisiana chiropractors were subsequently unable to convince the
state and federal courts that their form of practice was constitutionally
entitled to separate recognition. 06 However, England re-established
judicial willingness, dormant since Biggs and Collins, to compare the
qualifications required with the nature of the particular practice. 10 7
The following sections examine specific arguments which may be
made in challenges to the reasonableness of licensure requirements as
applied to limited practice.
B. The Right To Practice a Profession
Dent v. West Virginia recognized the "undoubted" right of every
citizen to follow "any lawful calling, business, or profession he may
choose," subject only to reasonable regulation through the exercise of
the state's police power.'08 Most subsequent cases have continued to
recognize this right,"0 9 although some courts refer to it as a "conditional
right" because of the inherent right of the state to regulate."0 Some courts
have further conditioned the right to practice a profession on a showing
that it is "useful.""' Apparently a profession is "useful" when there
is near-unanimity among experts in related professions that it is cap-
105. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 263 F.2d 661, 674 (5th
Cir. 1959) (emphasis added).
106. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 246 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. La.
1965); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 126 So.2d 51 (La. App.
1960). Subsequent cases have agreed that chiropractors are not entitled to recognition. In
1969, a federal court considered the issue so well settled that it refused to convene a three-
judge court to pass on the constitutional issue. Heaney v. Allen, 299 F. Supp. 1300 (E.D.N.Y.
1969).
107. This willingness was also expressed in State ex rel. State Bd. of Medicine v. Smith,
81 Idaho 103, 337 P.2d 938 (1959), in which a naturopath successfully challenged Idaho's
medical practice act as unreasonable.
108. 129 U.S. 114, 121 (1889). Accord, Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Medical Exam-
iners, 294 U.S. 608, 610 (1935). This right is secured by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. State ex rel. State Bd. of Medicine v. Smith, 81 Idaho 103,
109, 337 P.2d 938, 941 (1959) ("liberty") ; Aitchison v. State, 204 Md. 538, 544, 105 A.2d
495, 498 (1954) ("due process").
109. State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 416, 167 So. 394, 400 (1936); State v.
Errington, 355 S.W.2d 952, 957 (Mo. 1962).
110. E.g., Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Fife, 162 La. 681, 685, 111 So.
58, 60 (1926) ; Aitchison v. State, 204 Md. 538, 544, 105 A.2d 495, 498 (1954).
111. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 263 F.2d 661, 674 (Sth
Cir. 1959) ("useful and lawful"); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
259 F.2d 661, 674 (Sth Cir. 1958) ("useful"); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical
Examiners, 126 So.2d 51, 55 (La. App. 1960) ("usefulness").
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able of achieving beneficial results." 2 However, such a showing is
largely irrelevant, because once he has proven his "usefulness," the
limited practitioner must meet the greater burden of proving that the
denial of recognition is "arbitrary and unreasonable."'1 3 The "useful-
ness" test, therefore, adds nothing but confusion to the basic issue of
reasonableness.
The right to practice does not apply to an "inherently injurious"
activity." 4 It has been held that a limited practitioner who uses nothing
but natural substances and forces is not engaged in an inherently in-
jurious profession."'
C. Monopoly
Once the right to practice has been established, the next question is
whether that right has been arbitrarily deprived by the state. One of the
first attacks leveled against the early medical practice acts was that
they were an effort by M.D.'s to create a medical monopoly."' Modern
scholars do not agree as to whether the licensing statutes were pri-
marily designed as an anti-competitive measure to limit the number of
new health practitioners, or as a legitimate means of protecting the
public from quacks." 7 If the act were nothing more than a creature of
medical lobbyists, it would be arbitrary, and therefore unconstitu-
tional."' However, if there are reasonable grounds for sustaining the
act, the legislature's possible motives for passing it are irrelevant." 9
Therefore, the "monopoly" argument, by itself, is ineffective.
Monopoly becomes an effective argument when harm to the public
is shown. In Florida Accountants Association v. Dandelake," ° a group
of accountants attacked as unreasonable a Florida statute which re-
stricted the use of the word "accountant" to certified public accountants.
There were only 751 C.P.A.'s in the state, and many of the smaller
counties had none at all. Thus, if non-certified accountants were not
allowed to publicize their services, the demand for accountants would
have far exceeded the supply. Moreover, the non-certified accountants,
while not expert in all phases of accounting, were fully capable of
112. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 126 So.2d 51, 56 (La.
App. 1960).
113. England v. Louisana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 246 F. Supp. 993, 997
(E.D. La. 1965).
114. State ex rel. State Bd. of Medicine v. Smith, 81 Idaho 103, 110, 337 P.2d 938,
941 (1959) ; cf. Rabin v. Conner, 174 So.2d 721, 726 (Fla. 1965).
115. State ex rel. State Bd. of Medicine v. Smith, 81 Idaho 103, 110, 337 P.2d 938,
942 (1959).
116. State v. Biggs, 133 N.C. 729, 46 S.E. 401 (1903).
117. Compare Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & EcON. 93 (1961) (public
interest), with Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A
Legal and Social Study, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 505 (1965) (economics).
118. Florida Accountants Ass'n v. Dandelake, 98 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1957).
119. See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 246 F. Supp. 993, 996
(E.D. La. 1965); Rabin v. Conner, 174 So.2d 721, 725-26 (Fla. 1965).
120. 98 So.2d 323 (Fla. 1957).
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dealing with routine matters. The Supreme Court of Florida invalidated
the statute because it created a monopoly which deprived noncertified
accountants of their right to practice, and cast an undue hardship on
small businessmen who were dependent on accountants' services.
A similar argument is available in the health services field. There
is a nationwide shortage of qualified physicians,'' coupled with a grow-
ing demand for medical services.12 2 The projected number of practicing
physicians available in the future will continue to be inadequate. 23
Therefore, a doctor is a limited community resource. "There are not
enough of him in the United States today to warrant wasting a minute of
his education and experience on jobs others can do as well."'1 24 If the
limited practitioner can competently meet part of the demand for
health care, his status is similar to that of the noncertified accountant in
Dandelake. It is at least arguable that a monopoly may not be granted to
a profession which is unable to meet the needs of the public, when others
are able to satisfy at least a part of that need.
D. Lack of Necessity
A long line of Florida cases holds that regulations adopted in the
exercise of the police power must be "fairly necessary" to secure the
public welfare. 3 Most of these decisions invalidated regulations seek-
ing to control economic competition 26 or marketing practices, 27 or to
limit compensation for property "taken" by the state. 1 28 Courts have
traditionally granted the legislature greater discretion in regulating the
vital area of public health than in controlling private enterprise and
property rights.129 Therefore, these decisions offer little direct support
to limited practitioners seeking to attack the reasonableness of the
medical practice act.
The "necessity" principle has been extended beyond the confines of
private enterprise and property rights when the state has attempted to
regulate "innocent acts." In L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo,130 the Supreme
121. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON HEALTH MANPOWER, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HEALTH MANPOWER 6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as HEALTH
REPORT].
122. See H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, DOCTORS, PATIENTS, AND HEALTH INSURANCE (1961).
123. See U.S. SURGEON GENERAL'S CONSULTANT GROUP ON MEDICAL EDUCATION, PHYSI-
CIANS FOR A GROWING AMERICA (Public Health Service Pub. No. 709, 1959); HEALTH
REPORT, supra note 121.
124. NAT'L COMM'N ON COMMUNITY HEALTH SERVICES, HEALTH Is A COMMUNITY
AFFAIR 22 (1966).
125. E.g., Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navigation Control Auth., 171 So.2d 376
(Fla. 1965) ; Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1957) ("really necessary");
Florida Citrus Comm'n v. Golden Gift, Inc., 91 So.2d 657, 660 (Fla. 1956) ; State ex rel.
Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 412, 167 So. 394, 400 (1936).
126. State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 123 Fla. 401, 167 So. 394 (1936).
127. Florida Citrus Comm'n v. Golden Gift, Inc., 91 So.2d 657 (Fla. 1956).
128. Corneal v. State Plant Bd., 95 So.2d 1, 4 (Fla. 1957).
129. See, e.g., Semler v. Oregon State Bd. of Dental Examiners, 294 U.S. 608, 612
(1935).
130. 103 Fla. 552, 139 So. 121 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Maxcy].
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Court of Florida held that acts which are not harmful in themselves may
be regulated only when such regulation is "reasonably required" for
the accomplishment of a valid legislative purpose. The Maxcy "innocent
acts" doctrine was extended to health regulations in State v. Leone.131
A Florida statute required the supervision of all retail drug establish-
ments by a licensed pharmacist whenever these establishments were open
for business.132 The Supreme Court of Florida struck this statute as
unreasonable. It recognized that the state might, in the interest of
public health, require potentially dangerous drugs and medicines to be
sold only under the supervision of a licensed pharmacist. However,
modern drug stores sell many non-controlled drugs and non-medical
goods which require no pharmaceutical skill in their preparation and
sale. The sale of these goods involves no threat to the public health,
and thus comes within the Maxcy "innocent acts" doctrine. 33 In order
to regulate such acts as a health measure, the regulation
must be necessary, i.e. must be essential, to the reasonable ac-
complishment of the desired goal. . . . If there is a choice of
ways in which government can reasonably attain a valid goal
necessary to the public interest, it must elect that course which
will infringe the least on the rights of the individual. l 4
In both Maxcy and Leone, the state argued that although the in-
nocent act, when viewed in isolation, presented no threat to the public
interest, it was part of a larger class of activities which did threaten the
public. The state invoked a recognized exception to the "innocent acts"
doctrine:
Acts innocent and innocuous in themselves may . . . be pro-
hibited, if this is practically made necessary to be done, in
order to secure efficient enforcement of valid police regulations
covering the same general field.'35
This argument was rejected in both cases, because there existed other
methods of preventing the general evil which did not interfere with
individual freedom. Even though these other methods might present
greater difficulty of enforcement, "interference or sacrifice of private
rights can never be justified nor sanctioned merely to make it more
convenient or easier for the State to achieve the desired end."M30
The federal test is more lenient. If a legislative enactment "tend[s]
131. 118 So.2d 781 (Fla. 1960) [hereinafter cited as Leone].
132. Fla. Laws 1953, ch. 28150, § 1. This law was codified at the time of the Leone
decision in FLA. STAT. § 465.18 (1959).
133. 118 So.2d at 784.
134. Id. at 784-85.
135. L. Maxcy, Inc. v. Mayo, 103 Fla. 552, 572-73, 139 So. 121, 129-30 (1931).
136. State v. Leone, 118 So.2d 781, 785 (Fla. 1960). A similar result was reached in
Delmonico v. State, 115 So.2d 368 (Fla. 1963).
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to diminish an evil"1 ' and is not "arbitrary or unreasonable" ss it will
be upheld. The law "may enact a needless, wasteful requirement in
many cases. But it is for the legislature, not the courts, to balance the
advantages and disadvantages of the new requirement." 39
Under Florida law, if a limited practitioner can demonstrate that
his treatment offers no substantial threat to the health of his patients,
he would probably fall within the scope of the "innocent acts" doctrine.
The state could not successfully contend that he should be barred from
practice in order to render enforcement easier against quacks. In a
federal forum, the "innocent acts" argument would have little chance of
success.
E. The Nature of the Practice
Most of the cases which have decided the question of the reason-
ableness of the medical practice acts involved cultists claiming to prac-
tice a complete healing art. Few cultists were able to convince the courts
that their form of practice offered a viable alternative to the practice of
medicine. This is not surprising, because their methods generally did
not have a scientifically accepted foundation. 40 With the exception of
chiropractic, which enjoys legislative protection,' 4 ' the problem of non-
scientific healers has been brought under reasonable control.' 2 Un-
fortunately, statutes and judicial doctrines which were designed to
prevent unscientific practices now threaten to stifle the growth of scien-
tifically-valid treatment which is not offered as a substitute for medicine,
but as a valuable part of it.
The Supreme Court of Florida has adopted the England approach
of examining the characteristics of the practice in order to determine
whether the statutory requirements, as applied, are reasonable.' 43 In
Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd.,' 4 operators of weight-reducing spas chal-
lenged a statute which required them to complete a course of instruction
in physiology, anatomy, massage and hydrotherapy. Their operation
was chiefly confined to electrical machines. The court noted that the
educational requirements would not make the operators "more com-
petent in their particular occupation."'45 "Many of the statutory pre-
scriptions are obviously unrelated to competent performance of the
137. Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339 (1929).
138. Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 428 (1926).
139. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955). Florida has adopted a
similar position in the narrow area of election laws. Holley v. Adams, 238 So.2d 401, 405
(Fla. 1970).
140. Licensure of Physicians, supra note 1 at 298.
141. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 460 (1971).
142. Licensure of Physicians, supra note 1, at 298.
143. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 263 F.2d 661, 674 (5th
Cir. 1959). See note 103, supra, and accompanying text.
144. 151 So.2d 439 (Fla. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Snedeker).
145. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
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limited activities involved in appellees' operations .... On this basis
the court concluded that the statute was unreasonable as applied.
Snedeker implicitly validates the concept of limited practice. It
allows a limited practitioner to establish the unreasonableness of the
medical practice act as applied to him by showing that mastery of
the required subjects would not substantially increase the competence
of his particular form of treatment.
VI. CONCLUSION
Florida offers limited practitioners a favorable forum for an attack
on the reasonableness of medical licensing laws. Additionally, an equal
protection argument has some chance of success. Common sense rebels
against a regulatory system which legitimizes back-poppers and naturo-
paths, while denying even a limited right of practice to nutritionists,
non-hospital paramedical technicians, and scientific practitioners of de-
veloping forms of treatment.
If Florida Statutes, chapter 458 (1971), or its equivalent in an-
other state, is held invalid as applied to limited practitioners, a sudden
renaissance of quackery need not be feared. Reasonable alternatives to
total prohibition and medical anarchy do exist."' There is little to be
feared, for example, from the separate licensing of qualified nutrition-
ists. Reasonable educational qualifications can be established to protect
the public from "quacks, adventurers and charlatans." '148 As long as the
statutory prohibition against the use of the title "Dr." by non-M.D.'s 149
is maintained, there is no danger that the public will be misled by the
existence of new forms of limited practice.'5° Such a danger could be
eliminated by the simple expedient of requiring limited practitioners
to identify themselves in a prescribed manner.
Forms of practice should be responsive to advances in medical sci-
ence, free of unreasonably restrictive legal definitions. Florida's licensing
law does not permit such growth, and is thus a proper subject for judicial
surgery.
146. Id.
147. Cf. Snedeker v. Vernmar, Ltd., 151 So.2d 439, 442 (Fla. 1963): "Occupational
regulations of some nature might.., be lawfully imposed."
148. Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 195 (1898).
149. FLA. STAT. § 458.15(2)(c) (1971).
150. Cf. Florida Accountants Ass'n v. Dandelake, 98 So.2d 323, 329 (Fla. 1957).
